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RECENT DECISIONS
abled person is the same as the duty to an intoxicated person.
The appellant also made out a case grounded on the doctrine of
last clear chance. The learned judge in the Trial Term should have
charged as Chief Justice Pound suggested in the case of Storr v.
N. Y. Central R. R. Co.,4 that the doctrine is never wakened into
action unless and until there is brought home to the defendant to be
charged with liability, knowledge that another or his property is in a
state of present peril, in which event there must be a reasonable effort
to counteract the peril and avert its consequences. 5 If one by a negli-
gent act places himself or his property in a position of danger, his
negligence does not contribute to defeat his recovery if the situation
was known to the defendant in time to avert the consequence of the
plaintiff's own negligence. In such a case the defendant's negligence
is the sole cause of the injury. It must not run on "inert and callous"
and cause an accident which proper care might have avoided. Knowl-
edge may be established by circumstantial evidence, in the face even
of professions of ignorance,0 but knowledge there must be, or negli-
gence so reckless as to betoken indifference to knowledge. This doc-
trine of last clear chance, as set forth in many states, really means
that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a posi-
tion of peril, yet if another acts or omits to act with knowledge of the
peril and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recover.7
M. A. H.
NEGLIGENCE-MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY FROM
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS ARTICLE.-While wearing an evening gown
with a glazed double-netted skirt manufactured by the defendant, the
plaintiff was seriously injured when the netting of her dress ignited,
instantly enveloping her in flames. The plaintiff's proof tended to
show that the netting was treated with an explosive substance (nitro-
cellulose sizing) that rendered it inherently dangerous for the purpose
for which it was intended. From a judgment of the trial court grant-
ing the defendant's motion to set aside a plaintiff's verdict and for a
directed verdict on the ground that there was a deficiency in the
proof that the dress as manufactured and delivered was inherently
dangerous, the plaintiff appeals. Held, judgment reversed. The de-
fendant manufacturer did not adduce any evidence to show the nature
of the sizing used in the dress. The jury could properly take most
4261 N. Y. 348, 185 N. E. 407 (1933).
5 Panarese v. Union Ry. Co., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933); Wolo-
szynowski v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471 (1930).
6 Bragg v. Central New England Ry. Co., 228 N. Y. 54, 126 N. E. 253
(1920).
7 Chunn v. Washington City & Suburban Ry., 207 U. S. 302, 28 Sup. Ct.
63 (1907) ; Green v. Los Angeles Terminal R. F_ Co., 143 Cal. 31, 76 Pac. 719
(1903).
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strongly evidence presented in the plaintiff's case and find that her
injuries were proximately caused by the inherently dangerous sub-
stance used by the defendant in the manufacture of the gown. A
manufacturer is legally liable for personal injuries received by one
who uses the manufactured article in the ordinary and expected man-
ner when the manufacturer sells the inherently dangerous article for
use in its existing state, the danger not being known to the purchaser
and not patent, and notice is not given of the danger or it cannot be
-discovered by reasonable inspection. Elizabeth Noone v. Fred Perl-
berg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 460 (1944).
This decision is in keeping with the trend and strengthens the
manufacturer's liability for injury from inherently dangerous articles.
The rule has been extended from drugs to motor vehicles, toys, cos-
metics, lotions, household appliances, exploding container cases, food
cases, beverage cases and to wearing apparel. A dealer in drugs and
medicines who carelessly labels a deadly poison as a harmless medicine,
and sends it, so labelled, into the market, is liable to any person who
without fault on his part, is injured thereby, though it may have
passed through other hands, by intermediate sales, before it reached
the person injured.' This principle is not limited to poisons, explo-
sives, and things of light nature, or to things which in their normal
operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is
such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives
warning of consequences to be expected. If to the element of prob-
able danger is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespec-
tive of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully. If he is negligent where danger is to be
foreseen, a liability will follow. 2 In a case where the defendant
manufactured toy revolvers for use by children and the plaintiff was
injured when flames from such a toy ignited the costume which the
plaintiff was wearing, the court held the manufacturer liable on
grounds that he knew or should have known that such an article
would be used at gatherings where persons would probably be garbed
in inflammable material and damage might result.3 Underlying the
manufacturer's liability is the danger reasonably to be foreseen from
the intended use of the article.4
M.D.
1 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
2 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
3 Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N. Y. Supp. 496,
aff'd, 255 N. Y. 624, 175 N. E. 341 (1930).
4 Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., Inc., 249 App. Div. 835, aff'd, 274
N. Y. 631, 10 N. E. (2d) 586 (1937).
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